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Abstract—In recent years, there has been a significant increase
in the use of graph-formatted data. Socials networks, among oth-
ers, represent relationships among users and present interesting
information for researches and other third-parties. The problem
appears when someone wants to publicly release this information,
especially in the case of social or healthcare networks. In these
cases, it is essential to implement an anonymization process in
the data in order to preserve the privacy of users who appears
in the network. In this paper we present an algorithm for
graph anonymization, called Evolutionary Algorithm for Graph
Anonymization (EAGA), based on edge modifications to preserve
the k-anonymity model.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the representation of data on graph format
has experienced an exponential growth. This data format
allows the representation of complex structures in an easier
way than the traditional relational data. In graph-formatted
data each node represents a user or an entity, with some
optional number of numerical, nominal or categorical at-
tributes. In addition, the edges or links between nodes stand
for relationships among users or entities in a richer and more
intuitive way. A good example is presented by social networks.
Regardless of their kind or target, social networks have a lot of
interesting information for different field studies (psychology,
social sciences, etc). Therefore, graph data is very interesting
to scientists and companies around the world. The problem
emerges with the need to preserve the privacy of individuals
who appear in these social networks.
A preliminary approach to data anonymization, known as
naı¨ve anonymization, consists of removing all attribute-based
information which allows an attacker to re-identify the user in
the anonymized graph. An example is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1a shows a toy example of a social network, where
each node represents an individual and each edge indicates the
friendship relation between them. Figure 1b presents the same
graph after a naı¨ve anonymization, where node identifiers have
been removed and the graph structure remains the same. One
This paper is an updated and revised version of the paper published in
Casas-Roma, J., Herrera-Joancomartı´, J. and Torra, V. (2012). Algoritmos
gene´ticos para la anonimizacio´n de grafos. In XII Reunio´n Espan˜ola sobre
Criptologı´a y Seguridad de la Informacio´n (RECSI 2012) (pp. 243-248).
Donostia-San Sebastia´n.
Acknowledgments: This work was partially supported by the Span-
ish MCYT and the FEDER funds under grants TSI2007-65406-C03 “E-
AEGIS”, TIN2010-15764 “N-KHRONOUS”, CONSOLIDER CSD2007-
00004 “ARES”, and TIN2011-27076-C03 “CO-PRIVACY”.
can think users’ privacy is safe, but an attacker can break the
privacy and re-identify a user on an anonymized graph. For
instance, if an attacker knows that Ann has four friends and
two of them are friends themselves, then the adversary can
construct the 1-neighbourhood of Ann, depicted in Figure 1c.
From this sub-graph, the attacker can uniquely re-identify user
Ann on anonymized graph. Consequently, user’s privacy has
been broken by the attacker.
(a) G (b) G1 (c) GAnn
Fig. 1: Anonymization example, where G is the original
graph, G1 is the naı¨ve anonymous version and GAnn is 1-
neighbourhood of Ann.
The example we have depicted in Figure 1 is quite simple,
but it gives us an idea of the complexity on graph anonymiza-
tion process. Apart from the user’s properties, the structure and
relation among users can be used by an attacker to re-identify
users and attack the privacy of the graph.
In this paper we present an algorithm, called Evolutionary
Algorithm for Graph Anonymization (EAGA), in order to
preserve the user’s privacy on graphs, and it is based on the
k-anonymity model.
This paper is organized as follows. The notation is sum-
marized in Section II. In Section III, we review the state
of the art. Our algorithm is presented in Section IV. In
Section V we point out our experimental set up and then, we
discuss empirical results in Section VI. Lastly, we outline the
conclusions and propose guidelines for future work in Section
VII.
II. NOTATION
Let G = (V,E) be a simple graph, where V is the set
of nodes and E the set of edges in G. We define n = |V |
to denote the number of nodes and m = |E| to denote the
number of edges. We use d to define the degree sequence of
G, where d = {d1, d2, . . . , dn} is a vector of length n and
di is the degree of node vi ∈ V . We use Γ(vi) to denote the
neighbourhood of node vi, i.e, nodes adjacent to node vi.
III. STATE OF THE ART
There are different approaches for graph anonymization,
such as randomization methods (for example [2], [3] and [4]),
which are based on random edge modification processes, or
generalization methods (for instance [5] and [6]), which are
based on node and edge clustering to construct super-nodes
and super-edges hiding the individuals’ properties. Neverthe-
less, we will focus on k-anonymity methods in this paper.
The concept of k-anonymity was introduced by Sweeney [1]
for the privacy preservation on relational data. Formally, the
k-anonymity model is defined as: let RT (A1, . . . , An) be a
table and QIRT be the quasi-identifier associated with it. RT
is said to satisfy k-anonymity if and only if each sequence of
values in RT [QIRT ] appears with at least k occurrences in
RT [QIRT ]. The k-anonymity model indicates that an attacker
can not distinguish between different k records although he
manages to find a group of quasi-identifiers. Therefore, the
attacker can not re-identify an individual with a probability
greater than 1
k
.
Different concepts can be used to apply the k-anonymity
model on graphs. A widely option is using the node degree
as a quasi-identifier [7]. It is called k-degree anonymity. We
assume that the attacker knows the degree of some target
nodes. If the attacker identifies a single node with equal degree
in the anonymized graph, then he has re-identified this node.
K-degree anonymous methods are based on modifying the
graph structure (by adding and removing edges) to ensure that
all nodes satisfy the k-anonymity. In other words, the main
objective is that all nodes have at least k − 1 other nodes
sharing the same degree.
Pei and Zhou [8] consider as quasi-identifier the 1-
neighbourhood sub-graph of the objective nodes. Let k be a
positive integer. For a vertex vi ∈ V , vi is k-anonymous in
G if there are at least k − 1 other vertices v1, . . . , vk−1 ∈ V
such that Γ(vi),Γ(v1), . . . ,Γ(vk−1) are isomorphic. G is k-
anonymous if every vertex is k-anonymous in G. It is called
k-neighbourhood anonymity. Zhou et al. [9] consider all struc-
tural information about a target node as quasi-identifier and
propose a new model called k-automorphism to anonymize a
graph and ensure privacy against this attack. They define a
k-automorphic graph as follows: given a graph G, if k − 1
automorphic functions Fa(a = 1, . . . , k − 1) exist in G, and
for each vertex v in G, Fa1(v) 6= Fa2(1 ≤ a1 6= a2 ≤ k − 1),
then G is called a k-automorphic graph. Hay et al. [5] go
a step further. They propose a method, named k-candidate
anonymity, which uses queries as quasi-identifier. In this
method, a node vi is k-candidate anonymous with regard to
question Q if there are at least k − 1 other nodes in the
graph with the same answer. Formally, |candQ(vi)| ≥ k where
candQ(vi) = {vj ∈ V |Q(vj) = Q(vi)}. A graph is k-
candidate anonymous to question Q if all of its nodes are
k-candidate anonymous concerning question Q. The question
Q is modelled according to assume adversary’s knowledge.
A. k-degree anonymity
Liu and Terzi [7] develop a method based on adding and
removing edges from the original graph G = (V,E) in order
to construct a new graph G˜ = (V˜ , E˜) which fulfils k-degree
anonymity model. In k-degree anonymity we presume that the
only possible attack is when the attacker knows the degree
of some vertices. Therefore, if some vertex is identified with
certainty with this information, then we have an information
leakage. Formally, an anonymous graph G˜ = (V˜ , E˜) has
to verify the following restrictions: (1) G˜ must be k-degree
anonymous, V = V˜ and E ∩ E˜ ≈ E. This model ensures
the graph against re-identification attacks based on degree
knowledge of the adversary. Usually, the bigger the k value,
the bigger the privacy and also the information loss.
Their algorithm is two-step based. The first one modifies the
degree sequence of the original graph. The authors seek how
to obtain an anonymous k-degree sequence for a given specific
k value with the minimum number of changes on the degree
sequence. They resolve this part through linear programming
techniques. Then, the second step constructs a new graph G˜0
from the anonymized k-degree sequence generated on first
step. Then, they apply edge swap iteratively in order to obtain a
graph as equal as possible to the original one. The edge swap is
an operation among four nodes va, vb, vc, vd ∈ G˜i = (V, E˜i)
where (va, vc), (vb, vd) ∈ E˜i and (va, vb), (vc, vd) /∈ E˜i or
(va, vd), (vb, vc) /∈ E˜i where G˜i = (V, E˜i) is the graph G˜0
after i iterations. The target is to achieve an edge set as similar
as possible to the original one (E ∩ E˜ ≈ E).
IV. EAGA Algorithm
In this section we will present our approach for graph
anonymization, called Evolutionary Algorithm for Graph
Anonymization (EAGA)1, which is based on evolutionary
algorithms and focused on creating a k-degree anonymous
graph.
A high-level description of our proposal allows us to struc-
ture our anonymization algorithm in two steps, similar to the
approach by Liu and Terzi [7]:
1) In the first step, from the original degree sequence of
G = (V,E), d = {d1, · · · , dn}, we construct a new
sequence d˜ which is k-degree anonymous and minimize
the distance ∆ from the original sequence computed by
Equation 1.
∆(d˜, d) =
n∑
i=0
|d˜i − di| (1)
2) In the second step, we construct a graph G˜ = (V˜ , E˜)
where V˜ = V , E˜ ∩ E ≈ E and the degree sequence is
equal to d˜.
The process of creating the k-anonymous degree sequence
determines the anonymization level and the distance from the
original degree sequence. An optimal sequence has to provide
the requested k-anonymity level and has to minimize the
1Source code available at: http://deic.uab.cat/∼ jcasas/
distance from the original degree sequence. This last condition
is decisive for data utility and information loss.
A. Step I: Obtaining the k-degree anonymous sequence
The problem of obtaining a k-anonymous degree sequence
has certain peculiarities that must be considered:
• The number of elements in the degree sequence deter-
mines the number of nodes. Therefore, this value cannot
be altered.
• The values of the degree sequence are the degree of the
nodes. Hence, these values have to be integer in range
[0, n− 1].
• The total number of edges is half the sum of the degree
sequence, since each edge is counted twice in the degree
sequence. To preserve the number of edges, the sum of
the anonymized sequence must be equal to the sum of
the original sequence, i.e,
∑n
i=0 d˜i =
∑n
i=0 di.
• Each change on the degree sequence has to be translated
as an edge modification into the anonymous graph. Thus,
it is necessary to perform the minimum number of
changes in the degree sequence (minimizing the distance
between the two sequences) to obtain an anonymous
graph with the minimum number of changes from the
original one.
Our proposal uses evolutionary algorithms to generate the
k-degree anonymous sequence. Algorithm 1 details the above
steps to generate an anonymous degree sequence.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm pseudo-code for generating k-degree
anonymous sequence.
Require: Original degree sequence (d) and the k-anonymity
value (k).
Ensure: k-degree anonymous sequence (d˜).
INITIALIZE population⇐ d
k actual ⇐ GET K population
while k actual < k do
MUTATE population
EVALUATE new candidates
population⇐ SELECT individuals
k actual ⇐ GET K individuals
end while
d˜⇐ SELECT best candidate
return d˜
As we have shown in Algorithm 1, population is initialized
from original degree sequence. Next, the sentences in the while
loop are the generation step. Here we apply the basic mutation
process (MUTATE function in Algorithm 1) which adds one
to an element of the sequence and subtracts one to another
element of the sequence. This operation represents edge swap,
which is the most basic edge modification on a graph. For
example, if an edge (v0, v1) is modified by replacing one
node, one can obtain (v0, v2). This edge modification is
represented on the degree sequence as a subtraction on node
v1 (because it decreases its degree) and a addition on node
v2 (because it increases its degree). It is important to note
that our algorithm does not use crossover since this operation
systematically breaches the rule that preserves the number of
edges of the graph, generating invalid candidates. We consider
the performance of the algorithm would be affected by the
inclusion of this type of evolution, and improvements would
not occur in time or quality of the solution found.
When candidate generation is done, we evaluate the candi-
dates in order to find the best one. The score of each candidate
is determined by the fitness function (EVALUATE function in
Algorithm 1). This function assigns different score punctuation
whether each individual fulfils the desired k or not. Individuals
who do not meet the desired k-anonymity value are scored in
range [0,1] considering two parameters:
• The number of nodes which do not fulfil the k-anonymity.
• The dispersion level, computed as the average distance
from all nodes to the mean degree value.
Contrary, individuals who fulfil the desired privacy level are
scored in range [1,2] considering only one parameter:
• The distance from the original sequence. The target is to
minimize this value, as we described in Equation 1
Finally, the candidate selection uses the steady-state model.
According to it, the worst candidates of the actual generation
are replaced by the best candidates of the new generation.
B. Step II: Modifying the original graph
The result of the first step is a k-degree anonymous se-
quence. Then, in the second step we apply the necessary
modifications to original graph in order to obtain the k-
anonymous one. The anonymized k-degree sequence informs
the degree for each node on anonymized graph. Therefore, the
difference between original and anonymized degree sequence
points to nodes which have to increase or decrease their
degree. Hence, we have to add or remove edges to/from these
nodes.
As we can see in Algorithm 2, this step begins computing
the difference vector, ddif = d− d˜, which allows us to easily
detect which nodes have to increase or decrease their degree.
The algorithm removes incident edges to nodes which have to
decrease their degree, while it adds new edges to nodes which
have to increase their degree. We apply these modifications
removing the edge (vp, vq) ∈ E, where vq belongs to nodes
which have to decrease their degree, and adding a new edge
(vp, vr), where vr belongs to nodes which have to increase
their degree.
V. EXPERIMENTAL SET UP
Three real networks have been used to test the EAGA
algorithm: Zachary’s Karate Club [10], American College
Football [11] and Jazz Musicians [12]. Table I presents a
summary of their properties.
For each dataset, we analyse the evolution of the degree
histogram, comparing the histogram on anonymized and orig-
inal graphs. We use edge intersection to quantify the number
of edges which were on original graph and still are on
Algorithm 2 Algorithm pseudo-code for modifying the orig-
inal graph.
Require: Original graph G(V,E), original degree sequence d
and the k-degree anonymous sequence d˜.
Ensure: The graph G˜(V, E˜) where the degree sequence is d˜
and E˜ ∩ E ≈ E.
G˜(V, E˜)⇐ G˜0(V, E˜)
ddif = d− d˜
Vdel = {vi ∈ V |ddif (i) < 0}
Vadd = {vi ∈ V |ddif (i) > 0}
while Vdel 6= ∅ and Vadd 6= ∅ do
E˜ = E˜ \ {(vp, vq)} where (vp, vq) ∈ E and vq ∈ Vdel
Vdel = Vdel \ {vq}
E˜ = E˜ ∪ {(vp, vr)} where vr ∈ Vadd
Vadd = Vadd \ {vr}
end while
return G˜
Datasets Nodes Edges Av.deg. Av.dist. Diam.
Zachary’s Karate Club 34 78 4.588 2.408 5
American College 115 613 10.661 2.508 4
Jazz Musicians 198 2,742 27.697 2.235 6
TABLE I: Summary of selected network properties: Number
of nodes (Nodes), Number of edges (Edges), Average degree
(Av. deg.), Average distance (Av. dist.) and diameter (Diam.)
anonymized graph. Clearly, the higher the value, the less the
perturbation. This measure is defined by Equation 2 as follows:
EI(G, G˜) =
|E ∩ E˜|
max(|E|, |E˜|)
(2)
We also analyse three measures related to node centrality in
order to quantify the perturbation introduced on anonymized
data. The first measure is betweenness centrality. It measures
the fraction of number of shortest paths that go through each
vertex. Formally, we define the betweenness centrality of node
vi as:
BC(vi) =
1
n2
∑
s,t
gist
gst
(3)
where gist is the number of geodesic paths from vs to vt that
pass through vi, and gst is the total number of geodesic paths
from vs to vt.
Closeness centrality is the second centrality measure we
have used. It is defined as the inverse of the average distance
to all accessible nodes. Formally, we define the closeness
centrality of a node vi in Equation 4.
CC(vi) =
n∑
j dij
(4)
Finally, the third one is degree centrality, which evaluates
the centrality of each node associated with its degree. We
define the degree centrality of a node vi in Equation 5 as
follows:
DC(vi) =
Γ(vi)
m
(5)
The centrality measures described above evaluate the cen-
trality of each node of the graph from different concepts of
centrality. These measures give us a value of centrality for each
node. To assess the perturbation introduced in the whole graph,
we compute the vector of differences for each node between
the original and the anonymous graph and then, compute the
root mean square (RMS) to obtain a single value for the
entire graph. We define the difference of the centrality measure
between the original and the anonymous graph as:
Dif(G, G˜) =
√
1
n
((g1 − g˜1)2 + . . .+ (gn − g˜n)2) (6)
where gi is the value of the centrality measure for node vi of
G and g˜i is the value of the centrality measure for node vi of
G˜. In our experiments we use Equation 6 to compute a value
representing the error induced in the whole graph by EAGA.
Lastly, we want to evaluate how node set evolves during
the process of anonymization. In order to do this, we use the
Vertex Refinement Queries [2] [5]. This type of queries models
the local neighbourhood structure of a node in the graph. The
weakest knowledge query, H0(vj), simply returns the label of
the node vj . The queries are successively more descriptive:
H1(vj) returns the degree of vj , H2(vj) returns the list of
each neighbours’ degree, and so on. The queries can be defined
iteratively, where Hi(vj) returns the multi-set of values which
are the result of evaluating Hi−1 on the set of nodes adjacent
to vj :
Hi(vj) = {Hi−1(v1),Hi−1(v2), . . . ,Hi−1(vp)} (7)
where v1, v2, . . . , vp are the nodes adjacent to vj .
A candidate set for a query Hi (candHi) is the set of all
nodes with the same value of Hi. Consequently, the cardinality
of the candidate set for Hi is the number of indistinguishable
nodes in G under Hi. Note that if the cardinality of the
smallest candidate set under H1 is k, the probability of re-
identification is 1
k
. Hence, the k-degree anonymity value for
G is k.
candH1 = {vj ∈ V |H1(vi) = H1(vj)} (8)
We use the candH1 to analyse the evolution of nodes,
in terms of k-degree anonymity, during the anonymization
process.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The first dataset is a small social network with 34 nodes,
78 edges and a k-degree anonymity value equal to 1. EAGA
algorithm anonymizes it to k values equal to 2, 3, 4 and 5.
Figure 2a shows the original and k = 4 anonymized degree
histogram. As we can see, the degree histogram of original
graph follows the power-law (total number of nodes exponen-
tially decrease when degree value grows). Edge intersection
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Fig. 2: Experimental results for selected graphs. The first row contains the degree histogram of original (grey) and anonymized
(red) graphs. The second row contains the edge intersection as a function of k (x axis). The following row presents the root
mean square (RMS) of the three used centrality measures (i.e, betweenness, closeness and degree centrality) and finally, the
fourth row shows the k-degree analysis by CandH1 . The solid red line shows the percentage of nodes which can be directly
re-identified (i.e, nodes with a unique degree value), the dashed blue line shows the percentage of nodes with high risk of
re-identification (i.e, groups between 2 and 4 nodes with the same degree value), the dashed and dotted green line shows
percentage of nodes with moderate risk of re-identification (i.e, groups between 5 and 10 nodes with the same degree value)
and, finally, the dotted grey line shows percentage of nodes with low or very low risk of re-identification (i.e, groups of more
than 11 nodes with the same degree value).
is shown in Figure 2d. An anonymized graph with k = 2
the algorithm achieves an edge intersection value of 94.87%,
while this value descends to 79.49% when k-anonymity value
is equal to 5. Figure 2g shows the RMS on the three centrality
measures. Clearly, we want to keep these values closer to zero,
since the less values, the less noise introduced on anonymized
data. Though, the error increases as the k value grows. Finally,
we show the evolution of CandH1 as an extension to k-
degree anonymity value, since this information allows us to
see how nodes evolve in terms of re-identification during the
anonymization process. As shown in Figure 2j, the number
of nodes which can be directly re-identified (solid red line)
descends to zero when k achieves a value of 2, while the
number of nodes in high risk of re-identification (dashed blue
line) does not fall to zero until k = 5. When k is equal to 5,
all nodes are in moderate risk of re-identification (dashed and
dotted green line).
The second dataset is a collaboration network with 115
nodes, 613 edges and a value of k = 1. EAGA algorithm
anonymizes it to a k values in range 11-19, 23, 24 and
25. The degree histogram has experienced a few number of
modifications in order to achieve a k-anonymity value of 19,
as we can see in Figure 2b. Accordingly, this particular graph
structure only needs a few edge modifications in order to
achieve a great k-anonymity value. It is important to note that
more than 93% of edges remain the same on all anonymous
graphs (96.25% on graph with k = 19 and 93.64% on graph
with k = 25), as Figure 2e shows. Centrality measures, Figure
2h, show irregular perturbation on anonymous graphs. Finally,
CandH1 is shown in Figure 2k, presents an important decrease
on groups with direct, high and moderate re-identification risk
until a zero value has been reached when the k-anonymity
value is equal to 11. From this k value on, all nodes are well-
protected.
The third and the last dataset is a collaboration network with
198 nodes, 2,742 edges and a k-degree anonymity value equal
to 1. This graph presents an average degree quite higher than
others, close to 27 edges/node. The degree histogram in Figure
2c reveals the existence of two outlier nodes, with degree
values of 96 and 100. It is important to underline that these
two nodes are in danger of direct re-identification, but at the
same time due to their important centrality they are key nodes
for the graph structure (hubs). EAGA algorithm anonymizes
the graph only to a k = 2 value, due to the problem of
the outlier values. It would be necessary to modify the two
hubs of the graph in order to increase the k-anonymity value
and, therefore, those hubs nodes would lose their centrality
and produce high perturbation on anonymized data, reducing
significantly the data utility. The anonymized graph with k = 2
presents a high percentage of edge intersection (97.08%), as
we can see in Figure 2f, and a low error on centrality measures
(Figure 2i), which indicates that small perturbations have been
introduced on the anonymous graph. Finally, the CandH1 is
presented in Figure 2l. It only points out a decrease on group
of nodes with direct re-identification.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have presented an algorithm for graph
anonymization, based on edge modification approach in order
to achieve a desired k-anonymity value on anonymized graph.
The new algorithm, called Evolutionary Algorithm for Graph
Anonymization (EAGA), is based on evolutionary algorithms
to anonymize the degree sequence. The target of the evolution-
ary algorithm is to achieve a k-degree anonymous sequence
and minimize the distance between the anonymous degree
sequence and the original one, in order to preserve the data
utility. The second step applies iterative edge swap to the
original graph until the degree sequence is equal to the k-
degree anonymous one.
The results are favourable and indicate that the algorithm
is able to provide anonymized graphs with a value of k-
anonymity greater than the original one, and also keep a low
perturbation level on anonymized data.
Many interesting directions for future research have been
uncovered by this work. Firstly, recombination of parents as a
generation process should be considered. Although this does
not seem to improve the process, in-depth analysis would be of
interest for future works. Secondly, other measures to quantify
the perturbation introduced on anonymized graphs could be
implemented and analysed. Thirdly, other types of graphs
should be considered. For instance, directed or weighted
graphs present new challenges to anonymization process.
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